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Our data shows us the way beyond Eurocentrism. As we move
to produce a depiction of universal history along an evolutionary mainline we
need to keep in mind the second universal history we have defined. To take the
rise of the modern as directional history raises issues of Eurocentrism. Our
model enforces its own balance. Marx and Engels instanced the classic balance
needed to affirm the rise of the modern and yet criticize the form of its
realization. But those who criticize Eurocentrism, remarkably, seem to exempt
Darwinism, the absolute worst offender. The perfect ideology, noone sees through
it. In general the eonic model has a host of safeguards against misuse, e.g. as
a Eurocentric ideology.
We have already distinguished economic history from ‘eonic
sequence’, which means that globalization via economic interaction is not the
same as globalization in a cultural sense. Thus globalization might take many
different forms, e.g. as the realization of the cultural forms distinct from
those in the mainline sequence and/or the economic sequences. The attempt to
fill this void with economic markets is destined to obvious chaotification and
wrong results. The planet was in principle globalized at the time of the
Sumerians, in terms of reaching everywhere.
We need to see that our system is not about Europe, but
about global development. The resolution of the issue lies in the fact that a
global system operating via local transitional areas will suddenly show an
imbalance, and then move toward a new balance. But that can take centuries, and
in the interval interlopers appear making confusion out of everything. This
system is like trying to distribute moral codes via an army of looters. There
could be no more spectacular example of our global/local logjam than that
appearing in the nineteenth century, as a sprightly new culture of freedom
appears, but turning at once into the ambiguous ‘globalization’ of imperialists
and their colonialism, issues perfectly expressed by Karl Marx (questions of
Communism apart).
Note that this model is about potential, not historical
laws. What might have been and what could be are valid aspects of
the theory. This issue haunts the emergence of the modern. There is no
teleological justification or invocation of value-free social laws whatever for
unscrupulous ‘free action’ realizing historical outcomes. That’s the standard
for performance of operas, and should be the standard for historical
realizations. Our model works fine if we could assume a set of saints at each
stage. Economic self-interest, say, has no absolute status as a driving force.
Note that one great source of globalization was the
appearance of the great religions. Our system is desperate to upgrade
performance in the ‘free action’ factor. Yet by the time of Columbus our
Christian version of this is dysfunctional, is simply an ideological adjunct to
imperialism. Las Casas stands by wringing his hands, and that’s it. We should
note that the earlier manifestations of Christianity were not of this character,
and actually functioned as an underdog populism, spreading rapidly through the
Roman system. So our eonic mainline is always a step ahead of us.
Let us not blame Big History for our own flaws. At least
nature has done its task in its generative aspect behind the great religious
integrators of antiquity, whose value rapidly degrades to the point of becoming
counterproductive and enmeshed in their own irrelevant theological metaphysics.
This tables a few of the issues of Eurocentrism here, and
the point is that this model flows into its opposite, the greater stream of
universal history. But in general, the modern transition is in many ways open to
benign realization—in principle, at least. In general, by the standards of the
Assyrian empire the modern world system is clearly operating at a higher level
and trying to produce instruments of integration. The catch here is that modern
technology makes small mistakes disastrous, calamitous with body counts far
worse than anything dreamt of by the Assyrians. However, it is inexorable that a
counter-sequence challenging the eonic sequence should arise. We will create an
open matrix for that with our ‘fourth turning point’ exercise.[i]
[i] Arik Dirlik, Postmodernity’s Histories
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
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