5. The Pattern
Of Universal History

 Eurocentrism


World History 
And The Eonic Effect

Civilization, Darwinism, and Theories of Evolution
2nd. Edition
The Book
By  John Landon

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 5. The Pattern of Universal History   
 
      5.1 Modern to Postmodern                       
      
5.2 Three Turning Points?  
             
5.2.1 Deconstructing Flat History     
              5.2.2 A Gaian Matrix: The Myth of the Continents       
              5.2.3 Need For A Global Model: The Unit of Analysis
              5.2.4 Incredulity Toward Infranarratives   
              5.2.5 Eurocentrism   
       
5.3 A Great Divide    
              5.3.1 Revolutions Per Second    
              5.3.2 Econosequence, Technosequence,…and Eonic Sequence  
     
 5.4 Genesis of the Early Modern      
            
 5.4.1 Decline and Fall: The Idea of Progress     
        5.5 Resolving the ‘Axial Age’: A Differential Phase     
              5.5.1 From Turning Points to Eonic Transitions     
        5.6 Stream and Sequence: Archaic Greece   
             
5.6.1 Stream and Sequence: Canaan and ‘Israel/Judah’           5.7 The Birth of Civilization    
             
5.7.1 Invisible Transitions: A Frequency Hypothesis  
        5.8 The Eonic Effect
               5.8.1 Universal History as Eonic Sequence      
               5.8.2  An Eonic Model
               5.8.3  Relative Transforms and Eonic Emergents
            
              
5.8.4  Zoom Targets and Eonic Tracers    
               5.8.5 V-cones of Diffusion   
              
5.8.6 Fourth Turning Points? 
Endnotes
        5.9 A Frequency Hypothesis
              5.9.1 Spengler and Toynbee  
             
5.9.2 From Cyclical Theories to Eonic Sequence    
              5.9.3 The Fundamental Unit of Historical Analysis
              5.9.4  Discrete-continuous Models

 5.2.5 Eurocentrism
    

 Our data shows us the way beyond Eurocentrism. As we move to produce a depiction of universal history along an evolutionary mainline we need to keep in mind the second universal history we have defined. To take the rise of the modern as directional history raises issues of Eurocentrism. Our model enforces its own balance. Marx and Engels instanced the classic balance needed to affirm the rise of the modern and yet criticize the form of its realization. But those who criticize Eurocentrism, remarkably, seem to exempt Darwinism, the absolute worst offender. The perfect ideology, noone sees through it. In general the eonic model has a host of safeguards against misuse, e.g. as a Eurocentric ideology.

We have already distinguished economic history from ‘eonic sequence’, which means that globalization via economic interaction is not the same as globalization in a cultural sense. Thus globalization might take many different forms, e.g. as the realization of the cultural forms distinct from those in the mainline sequence and/or the economic sequences. The attempt to fill this void with economic markets is destined to obvious chaotification and wrong results. The planet was in principle globalized at the time of the Sumerians, in terms of reaching everywhere.

We need to see that our system is not about Europe, but about global development. The resolution of the issue lies in the fact that a global system operating via local transitional areas will suddenly show an imbalance, and then move toward a new balance. But that can take centuries, and in the interval interlopers appear making confusion out of everything. This system is like trying to distribute moral codes via an army of looters. There could be no more spectacular example of our global/local logjam than that appearing in the nineteenth century, as a sprightly new culture of freedom appears, but turning at once into the ambiguous ‘globalization’ of imperialists and their colonialism, issues perfectly expressed by Karl Marx (questions of Communism apart).

Note that this model is about potential, not historical laws. What might have been and what could be are valid aspects of the theory. This issue haunts the emergence of the modern. There is no teleological justification or invocation of value-free social laws whatever for unscrupulous ‘free action’ realizing historical outcomes. That’s the standard for performance of operas, and should be the standard for historical realizations. Our model works fine if we could assume a set of saints at each stage. Economic self-interest, say, has no absolute status as a driving force.

Note that one great source of globalization was the appearance of the great religions. Our system is desperate to upgrade performance in the ‘free action’ factor. Yet by the time of Columbus our Christian version of this is dysfunctional, is simply an ideological adjunct to imperialism. Las Casas stands by wringing his hands, and that’s it. We should note that the earlier manifestations of Christianity were not of this character, and actually functioned as an underdog populism, spreading rapidly through the Roman system. So our eonic mainline is always a step ahead of us.

Let us not blame Big History for our own flaws. At least nature has done its task in its generative aspect behind the great religious integrators of antiquity, whose value rapidly degrades to the point of becoming counterproductive and enmeshed in their own irrelevant theological metaphysics.

This tables a few of the issues of Eurocentrism here, and the point is that this model flows into its opposite, the greater stream of universal history. But in general, the modern transition is in many ways open to benign realization—in principle, at least. In general, by the standards of the Assyrian empire the modern world system is clearly operating at a higher level and trying to produce instruments of integration. The catch here is that modern technology makes small mistakes disastrous, calamitous with body counts far worse than anything dreamt of by the Assyrians. However, it is inexorable that a counter-sequence challenging the eonic sequence should arise. We will create an open matrix for that with our ‘fourth turning point’ exercise.[i]


 

[i] Arik Dirlik, Postmodernity’s Histories (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

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Last modified: 01/14/2006