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The resolution of the paradox of historicism is empirically given by the eonic
data, and lies before us in something like the electronic ‘on-off’ switch, to
match our intermittent or ‘eonic’ data. That’s crude thinking, but sufficient
for large-scale periodization analysis. We have a mixed situation, free agent,
and (causal) mechanism. Choice and mechanism operate in tandem. We see our
mysterious drumbeat switches on over a brief time scale of centuries relative to
millennia in non-contingent evolutionary event-regions. Instead of an on-off
switch we see something like ‘switched on’ periods with relative degrees of
freedom in the appearance of less conditioned periods able to innovate rapidly.
How to proceed with such a strange set of facts? But there is a simple
explanation here: change can occur in the agent’s self-consciousness, in the
middle ground between determinism and freedom. Look at the eonic effect. Higher
degrees of freedom show both deterministic and free influence overlaid. We call
that ‘creative action’, in most cases. Note that creativity creates a sense of
freedom, but isn’t controlled by its agent. Thus, confusing the question is the
fact that ‘free agency’ and ‘freedom’ are not the same necessarily. ‘Choice’ is
an observational given, however we explain it. We need not decide about free
will to recount the history of ‘choices’, branches of potential outcomes
becoming realized. We have the clue to proceed.
Further, as we will see as this logic unfolds, the ‘causal
agency’ is trying to ‘cause freedom’. The eonic effect is itself like an
‘evolution of freedom’. This crosses the
tripwire into a classic ‘contradiction’ as our subject transforms into something
else, that something being somewhere in the vicinity of the philosophy of
history. We will see that the eonic effect straddles the twin domains of the
deterministic and the emergence of man as a ‘free agent’ with potential freedom.
The problem of historicism disappears if we renounce causal laws and predictions
of the future, and look only toward patterns of creative action, in the past,
taking care to define the transition from this past to the open present. We
don’t need a proof of man’s free will, or some scheme of historical laws, and
will complete our eonic model without deciding these issues.
But we do need a model that shows some kind of ‘determination’ in our pattern,
and yet switches off in the present, for the evolution of freedom must have a
free future. Such seemingly bizarre properties are in fact everyday occurrences,
and will form the basis of a model. That’s very strange, and only an example
will help, make it transparent. The eonic effect is such an example.
The issue of self-consciousness can be grounded in nothing more
complex than the power of attention, contrasted with states of consciousness
that are more mechanized. We don’t need to commit on any psychological theory to
consider it this way, although collating creativity and self-consciousness is an
oversimplification. No theory of evolution has ever properly accounted for the
emergence of the power of attention (which clearly antedates man’s emergence).
But we must assume, as an example of our issue of relative beginnings, the man
we find, a creature with a complex power of attention, which he can control to
some extent. The point is that there is nothing mystical in the issue of
self-consciousness.
Notes: Mechanized consciousness We tend to
distinguish consciousness and mechanism, but the issue is not so simple.
Inattentive states of mechanized consciousness can be almost as mechanical as
machinery, a hard fact of life. Almost any state of consciousness can become
habitual, hence mechanized. That is, we cease to bring attention to these states
of consciousness. The distinction of self-consciousness and consciousness is one
of the most ancient, yet also one that often falls into disuse because of this
very mechanization of human consciousness. It is the object of immense sutras
and discourses, yet there is no mystery here, and we see the difference in the
power of attention to change a state of consciousness, to alertness. Note
that this is the crux, in so far as ‘changes of attention’ are themselves
sometimes ‘caused’ by exterior events, but can also become the object of pure
intention, up to a point. Man’s ability to control his attention is
marginal at best, but real. In some formulations, the power of attention is an
act of ‘will’ that induces self-consciousness. We can leave the issue open, but
as we examine the eonic effect we see that the clue lies in changes of
consciousness, at the point of creative advance. We must also grant that
such changes of consciousness can occur outside the periods of the
eonic effect, since the property is a potential already given. That’s the whole
point, to pass beyond the ‘freedom induction’ to freedom beyond induction. We
need a model, not of consciousness, but of relative changes of consciousness.
These distinctions provide that, albeit in rather primitive fashion (creativity
could arguably be seen as ‘self-consciousness’, but the reality is undoubtedly
more complex, all we need is a two-state psychology for our model).
Thus, we have enough for a minimal evolutionary psychology
on which the macro factor appears to operate. We have this state of
self-consciousness in our repertory, and it occurs fifty times a day, yet we
become confused when we think about it. We can adopt the distinction to stay out
of trouble with ‘free will’ issues, retreating in practice to a more generalized
‘free action’. Self-consciousness can easily mimic ‘will’ and leaves us
suspicious that that is all it is. Instead of ‘free will’, we can ‘nudge the
elephant’ with episodes of transient self-consciousness. A close look shows that
this happens all the time. Addicted to a drug, someone might notice his lack of
freedom, i.e. become ‘selfconscious’ with respect to his own mechanization. And
the ‘will’ to change that, successful or not, would tend to ‘nudge the
elephant’, i.e. start with an episode of ‘self-consciousness’, free will or not.
This is one clue to what we see in history. Look at our
example of the so-called ‘Axial’ age. Men produced a great
advance, and this was their free series of choices. Yet we also see that this
shows some form of greater historical determination. So men were evidently not
‘free’ to produce this alone. And yet they were free, up to a point. Witness the
differences of realized effects of this creative period. They were all
different, yet they share a mysterious core. That core is simply creativity. Or
more generally what we will call ‘self-consciousness’. It is like a business and
investment. The investor does nothing, yet his investment causes everything to
be done. But it is the agent of that business whose ‘free action’ executes a new
series of innovations. The point is clear, although such metaphors are liable to
work only up to a point. |
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