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It is fascinating that J.B. Bury’s classic The Idea of Progress
sees
fit to begin in the mysterious interval between the death of Machiavelli, and
the philosopher Jean Bodin a generation later, as he casts off the ‘cyclical
theme and variations’ of the idea of the Four Kingdoms and sees the three
stage periodization of world history in a progressive mode, roughly
corresponding to the Mesopotamian, classical, Mediterranean, and European
stages.[i]
This arrangement of Bury’s account is altogether apt indeed,
and proves one aspect of our thesis, that the appearance of historical ideas
themselves corresponds self-referentially to the pattern we wish to point out.
The idea of progress has been increasingly questioned at its roots in recent
generations, after its great period of nineteenth century flowering. But the
critique has itself gone to an extreme that is not intuitive, and is under
suspicion of being perversely wrong. The idea of progress was essential in the
labor of birth struggling against the inertia of antiquity.[ii]
Part of the difficulty is the use of the idea of progress for
ideological purposes in ‘banner of the regiment’ meanings, thence to expect
it to have theoretical standing unsullied by its history. The relation of
slavery and warfare, and other negative aspects of the modern transformation, to
the idea of progress requires careful redefinition, in order to rescue the basic
idea to the creative ferment of ‘real progress in action.’[iii]
Theodore Olson
, in Millennialism,Utopia
nism, and Progress
Utopianism, and Progress
, criticizes the assumptions of the
idea of progress
, as the doctrine that “there is a blind force, uncontaminated by historical
contingency, dedicated to the continued improvement of man [that] is the central
affirmation of the notion of progress”. This engages the issue perfectly.
Defenders of progress often fail to answer to this sort of objection. He
complains that the persistence of this idea can only be explained by its
manifest convenience, and declares the notion to be at root a form of
incoherence, a variant of Fisher
’s lament. Although it is certainly true that proponents of the idea of
progress do not often realize the difficulties of their position, use the idea
ideologically or in a salto morale,
and suffer the confusions of this fact, Olson’s statement is as open to
challenge as the view under fire, for its assumption is that there is nothing to
drive progress. If we suspect that there is, the argument fails immediately.[iv]
The eonic effect reveals the evidence that there is.
‘Progress’ shows itself clustered around three great turning points of
history, the last of which gave birth finally to the idea itself. But as we
begin to realize the existence of an historical patterning, we can easily
misapply the idea of progress to its explanation, but to deny completely the
progression as progress of civilization from the time of Sumer would be almost
absurd.
But in any case here is an example of the way our pattern
will reopen an old perspective, and promptly be frittered away, if we do
see the net equivalent of a ‘blind force’ or ‘progress pusher’ in our
historical surges, and give it any cogency without a commitment to the real
difficulties of historical systems, and these in the heritage of Newtonian
dynamics, and the development of analytical reductionism. Quite apart from
defining the meaning of progress, and its relation to issues of ‘facts and
values
’, to hypostatize a ‘force’ to match the data in this or any other
historical study, in the heritage of or on the grounds of the breakdown of
post-Newtonian systems, will provoke more of the same endless controversy,
unless we can truly catalogue this force in a reductionist manner without
invention or metaphysical trappings. Since this is exceedingly difficult to do,
we are struck dumb, and must confine our activities to empirical correlation,
but with an ‘epur si muove’ of suspicion about the larger motion of historical
development, the more so if we begin to realize such a process could not result
from planned human futurist activity. This takes us out of the business of
stating historical causality in the
same breath as the assertion of historical progression. There is a great irony
here. The linear sense of time, the idea of progress, the obvious connection to
the Augustinian, and, thence, the Zoroastrian, schemes of history, are found to
lack a driver. The only workhorse mule for this task will be the ‘cycl
ical’, hopefully shorn of its dreadful implications of ‘eternal return’.
The cyclical impostor is seen to be the real manifestation of the dynamics of
evolution, as this applies to culture, or civilization. But this approach
requires great caution, for it demands one extension against reductionist
shortfall in the bootstrap of foundational notions arising from the hard
sciences. No effort in this regard has ever succeeded without positing ghost
forces, extra laws, vitalist trappings, ‘cgfx’ forces, Casper the Ghost
Force X. It is almost ironic that our subject starts in analysis and ends in
seeing that our eonic pattern includes this game of ‘cgfx-ing’ as downfield
new-aging. Each of our great turning points will show the same outbreak of
‘involutionary’ preoccupation.
The basic point Olson is making highlights the further
apparent contradiction between non-teleological science and its social vehicle
inherited from the Enlightenment animated by the idea of progress. The grand
force then becomes beholden to enlightened ‘rationality’ on which a sudden
increased burden is placed to be the mover of history. The most we can hope is
that it is on the way to becoming so as a developmental emergent, for it is
unlikely that rationality alone can explain the process of social evolution
. We have but to look at the history of science, draw a chart, and notice the
rhythmic complexities of its emergence, and its nearly jump-started surges of
development. Thus the all-important rationality is also an evolute, of the eonic
variety. However, wary of the confusions of the idea of progress, we can proceed
to a more generalized idea of ‘eonic progression’ as a generalized concept
beyond that of progress. And this can resolve many of the idea’s difficulties,
for the idea of progress is a product of this progression, not a name for its
‘law’. We need to admit to the change of meaning in the term ‘progress’
in our eonic sense, which simply does not correspond to its original usage, as a
concomitant of a linear view of time, or a view that history is continuous
incremental change. We are close to the arch-confusion, whereby the sense of
‘linear directionality’ is born during a cyclical interrupt.[v]
Eonic Progression and the Idea of Progress We must distinguish eonic
progression, from the idea of progress
, as this confuses the idea of a ‘law of history’ with the potential of
‘free action’, as indeed these are entwined during the period of
acceleration. The idea of progress is a joyride emergentist free action script
caught in metonymy of part and whole. Further, the idea of progress is a
preeminent exemplar of what we call an eonic emergent, appearing, in direct
correlation, during the rise of the modern transformation. It was nearly born
among the Greeks. The modern idea swings in opposition to the cyclical as the
linear, but we see that the relationships are more complex, for the cyclical
restores the linear, and drives the path. Suddenly we see that the idea is
suffering a level confusion, and might suffer it in our account. Keeping
straight the ironic meaning of ‘eonicevolution
evolution’
’ and one of its emergents, if this is applied self-referentially to itself
must require some unknown new form of ‘escher-hand’ theory. And thus the
issue of progress is indeterminate, for we are ourselves are creating our
progressive means, even as the process of history moves through one of its great
progressions. We can see progress without its idea. In antiquity we see the idea
arriving at the threshold of being born during the time of the Greeks.
[i] J.B. Bury, The
Idea of Progress (London: MacMillan, 1920), Chapter II, “Universal
History”, p. 37. This work seems the real mcCoy. The literature of
progress is itself so vast that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make
a statement about it that has not already been contradicted by a complex
argument. The idea of progress is so vexed by its own contradictions that
its champions have ended up on the defensive, which is unnecessary, and a
gift to those social forces that wish to undermine the structure of
modernity. Defining ‘progress’ is tantamount to knowledge of the future,
it is a risk, an adventure, a search. Defining it once and for all would be
suicidal. As an idea it is an accessory, its espousal cannot lead to the
solution of real problems, unless these were issues of theoretical
understanding, almost as a thermodynamic inquiry into order and progression
as such. Like the steam whistle of the first locomotives, it is only a token
that the train is underway, the great flourish of the times. Progress and
the idea are not the same. Belief in progress conveys no automatic guarantee
of development. Development has frequently occurred without such a belief.
Eonic evolution and eonic progress, as concepts, will allow us to see that
‘progress’ is an eonic emergent of the modern period of eonic
progression, that springs from the modern period, whatever its intimations
in earlier ideas. Two good reviews of the ideas of progress are Good
Tidings: The Belief in Progress from Darwin to Marcuse (Bloomington:
Indiana, 1972), by W. Warren Wagar, and Progress:
Critical Thinking about Historical Change (Westport: Conn., 1993), by
Raymond Duncan Gastil. For the relation to the battle of the Ancients and
Moderns, cf. Kenneth Bock, “Theories of Progress, Development and
Evolution” in R. Nisbet & T. Bottomore (eds.), A
History of Sociological Analysis (NY: Basic Books, 1978). For surveys
and bibliographies, cf. The Idea of
Progress (1968), by Sidney Pollard, and The
Idea of Progress (NY: Basic Books, 1967), by Charles Van Doren, John
Bernstein, Progress and the Quest for
Meaning (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson, 1993). For the
constructions of the idea in the nineteenth century, cf. Peter Bowler, The
Invention of Progress (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). For indications of the
early emergence of the idea of progress in the Ancient world, cf. Ludwig
Edelstein’s The Idea of Progress in
Classical Antiquity (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1967), Christian Meier, The
Greek Discovery of Politics (Cambridge: Harvard, 1990), and with an
Augustinian viewpoint, John Baillie’s The
Belief in Progress (1950). For an attack on the idea of Progress, based
on Popper’s critique of historicism, but with a very close reading of the
ancient sources that most regurgitations of the views of progress never get
straight, cf. The Great Year (Penguin, 1994), by Nicolas Campion. In an
interesting but flawed study attempting to revise Bury, Robert Nisbet, in History
of the Idea of Progress (NY: Basic Books, 1979) attempts to fend for the
idea of progress against a tide of resistance to note that “while the
twentieth century is far from barren of faith in progress, there is
nevertheless good ground for supposing that when the identity of our century
is eventually fixed by historians, not faith but abandonment of faith in the
idea of progress will be one of the major attributes.” At the end of a
valuable study attempting to find the roots of the idea in the ancient
world, he ends with its capture by a conservative definition whose emphasis
is on tradition. His redefinition is very dubious, as it suggests a false
relationship, of conservative intent, between religion and progress, whose
relations are highly complex, and change from one era to the next. Part of
the confusion, in fairness to Nisbet, is his shrewd realization that in an
era of scientific reductionism, there is nothing to drive Progress except a
crypto-providential force, a point noted and used as a criticism of the idea
of progress by Theodore Olson, in Millennialism,
Utopianism, and Progress, ( p. 9).
[ii] Cf. Herbert Butterfield, The
Origins of Modern Science (1957), Chapter 12, “Ideas of Progress and
Ideas of Evolution”.
[iii] We should hardly wonder
that the idea has all the difficulties pointed to in our free action script
‘laws’ whose implied executive principle undermines them at once. The
example of slavery is both the nemesis and hint of the solution. Is a law of
history purely materialist and value-neutral? As we move toward an idea of
sequential dependency in relation to ecumenization, we notice that there is
a ‘core and periphery’ difference in the distribution of slavery in
modern times. That is just enough to warn us against purely material
compromises in our thinking. The appearance of the idea of tragedy, it would
seem, should give second thoughts to any theorist, i.e. that, because
history shows dangerous execution, the cynical version of its law is
anything more than false realization of potential. History has outsmarted
most theorists. The bad guys get a warning. As we move to put an executive
principle in our Folder 4, we should move in relation to a
‘super-goodfellow’ solution in relation to endless cyclical restarts at
higher potential. The point is so obvious in the ‘progress’ of the Roman
Republic. The realization of ‘primitive liberalism’ was so mediocre,
everything came to a stop. This is impractical, politicians to protest, but
Folder 4 would require timeless observations, or all time. Why decide? The
materialist theory of economic history, and Hegel’s World Spirit are
booted out the door.
As David Brion Davis has pointed out, in Slavery
and Human Progress, the onset of modern progress in its earliest phase
saw a period of the expansion of slavery. Davis calls his work a study of
the momentous shift from ‘progressive slavery’ to ‘progressive
emancipation’ in the late eighteenth century. David Brion Davis, Slavery
and Human Progress (1984), p. xvii, and Chapter 1, “ How ‘Progress
Led to the Europeans’ Enslavement of Africans”. Cf. also David Brion
Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca, NY: Carwell,
1966). Cf. also, John Nef, War and
Human Progress (Cambridge: Harvard, 1952).
[iv] Theodore Olson, in Millennialism,
Utopianism, and Progress (1982), p. 265.
[v] . Cf. Kenneth Bock, Human
Nature and History (NY: Columbia, 1980), p.40. This book contains an
important series of observations on the non-uniformity of historical rates
of change, along with a critique of the misuse of the developmental idea of
progress in a theory. The confusion becomes almost absurd, if not
Chaplinesque. We banish progress from evolution, and then evidently should
deprive ourselves of contemporaneous forward movement ideology. Bock’s
criticism of the theoretical concept of progress is nonetheless a valid statement
about passivity in relation to a fictitious social force that would relieve
us of active efforts of social
concepts of improvement. The difficulty will disappear in our distinction of
‘free action’ and ‘eonic determination’.
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