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Our riddle is solved at once, then, by slightly extending
the range of examination, to see that while there may be a local explanation for
decline, there must be a global explanation for the rise. Our model won’t tell
us why Rome
declined, only that its (relative) genesis is in the great seminal era of
cyclical upturn. We are at the point of seeing the one great clue to the
emergence, as evolution, of civilization itself, in this strange phenomenon of
synchronous acceleration. All across Eurasia, from Rome,
to Greece, to the Near East,
to India, and China, we see a sudden burst of cultural
acceleration, with a center of gravity around –600, the time of the Exile in the
case of Israel.
We are back at our starting point, the mysterious drumbeat sounding across Eurasia in the period from ca. –900, and over by –400.
Beginning in the nineteenth century this perception of
synchronous emergence in classical antiquity began to crystallize. These are ‘eonic
observations’, and the redactors of the Judaic tradition were the first to
observe the compression of their history and immediately cast this into the
classic form that we have received from them. A similar sense appears in the
history of Buddhism, the wheel of dharma. The Judaic tradition is exceptional
here, for the Greeks tended not to realize the phenomenon of their almost more
remarkable and isomorphic history of this period. Let us note in passing, lest
we get confused over ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’, that we see the birth of
monotheism, but also the Greek proto-secular Enlightenment (matched with the
last spectacular flowering of Greek polytheism).
The birth of monotheism and science are synchronous, therefore. Our
data is a superset of such eonic observations passing so quickly into a great
myth. The distinction of sacred history has no meaning. Clearly we are seeing a
spectrum of outcomes that blend into each other. But we must be wary of reducing
them to a common denominator. Our system is exploring diversity.
The number of cultural processes that undergo rapid
transformation in this period is remarkable, and it is not until modern times
that we see anything comparable. One problem is that the scale of the process is
tremendous, the study of five time slices in parallel. The logistics defeats
observation, like a blind man reading a Braille text of a movie script. We don’t
quite see the spectacular effect. Normal historiography specializes in the part,
but this requires a greater whole. Thus specialized study tends to lose
perspective on the echoing parallels reverberating across Eurasia as this drumbeat clocks multiple innovations
appearing in the ongoing momentum of the target areas. The Old Testament
unwittingly suggests the time-frame for this interval, from after around –900 to
the proximate period around –600, if we distinguish carefully a kind seminal
period from its first spectacular fruits in the rough two centuries after –600.
Thus, in the
clearest case we see the world of the Greeks emerge from its so-called Dark Age,
suddenly begin a quiet transformation in the Archaic, then flower in spectacular
fashion after –600, significantly the period of Solon. The change in character
of the phenomenon shows how it is quite suddenly on the wane after around –400,
and within a few centuries men are looking backwards to this era as an
historical enigma. The remarkable thing is that we see this synchronous
phenomenon in a fashion that transcends the possibilities of cross diffusion,
which are nonetheless considerable. The Israelites had heard of the Iliad,
there is an influence, but we cannot explain the one from the other. We might
thus include the emergence of Rome
as an additional independently emergent center, yet we see it more clearly as a
variant of the Greek city state expansion characteristic of the Greek Archaic, that
is, in part a case of diffusion. But with Greece, Israel, India
and China
we have no basis to claim that one triggers the other. We get the suggestion of
something occurring ‘on schedule’.
All we can really do is to try and observe this phenomenon
by setting out rough periodization boundaries. Later, on the analog of the
modern we can partition our Axial phase as transition and divide, which is easy
to spot. We will examine this ‘differential boundary’ below as being about –900
to –600. This puts a ‘divide’ near –600, after which we find a brief flowering
followed by a rapid fall-off. It is almost eerie. Within a generation or two the
character of the Greek era changes gears and a great flowering is over (this
falloff and the divide are not the same). We had thought that coincidental, but
it falls like ripe fruit into our periodization scheme. The factor of eonic
determination is waning, and the high-octane fuel starts to be exhausted. The
‘punctuation’ is over and the eonic emergents head
out under their own steam, if they survive at all. Greek democracy and tragedy don’t
survive.
A birth of democracy
Let us continue to track the history of democratic emergence in our system, to
note once again: twice in a row, democracy shows correlated jump-start emergence
in the eonic sequence, more, just at the point of the divide. Twenty-four
hundred years to the decade separate Solon and the modern divide! We see the
sudden appearance of a string of democratic revolutions at the end of the
eighteenth century, just as our modern transition is concluding. In the Axial
period, we see the fragile Athenian experiment emerge from ‘raw republicanism’
in the sixth century. To repeat, we can see that this is no coincidence. Clearly
democracy as micro-action is at risk as it sets sail into the uncharted waters
of its mideonic period!
We can probably extend this backwards to our first
transition, the system of Sumerian city-states, but the data is blurred, and it
is probable that emergent civilization is too primitive for democracy to appear.
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