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The value of our model is that it gives us a rationale for
the demarcation of the so-called ‘rise of civilization’ as instead a phase of
transition in a greater history that precedes it. This helps to resolve the
continuity/discontinuity snafu that besets the obvious perception of this
interval, without the means to properly consider its status. We come thus to the
spectacular rise of ‘civilization’ visible in the rise of Sumer and Dynastic Egypt. We begin
at the halfway mark, as close to the modern world, as to the onset of the
Neolithic. The point is worth considering since this ‘axial’ period generates
the basic tone of future civilization. If Hegel, at the modern divide, is musing
oddly about the divine sanctity of the state, to the frowns of Marx, and the
horror of libertarians, it is because the State shows eonic generation, whatever
its beginnings in Paleolithic chieftaincy, and is cast in eonic granite,
starting here, and subsequent stages of the eonic sequence respond to the first,
Sumerian/Egyptian, experiments.
An incomplete picture
We need to exercise caution with our first visible transition era, since the
data is just on the borderline of our centuries level standard of observational
data. A more complex picture of the rise of the new era of cities and states is
always possible, and likely. What about the rest of
Eurasia in this period? Synchronous factors
prior to the existence of writing would pass undetected. However, we suspect
that a flagship mainline more than justifies our emphasis on Sumer and Egypt, and we can see that our
frequency hypothesis is basically confirmed here, even given the probable
incompleteness of our portrait.
Cities, state formation, and the first intimations of
organized technology suddenly come together in the last centuries before –3000.
The key invention of writing changes the entire course of history and is justly
considered the beginning of history, save that we have defined that to include
the earliest homo sapiens. It is hard
to assess to what degree this emergence of the State is an absolute historical
first here, but the crystallization and advance are for all intents and purposes
the real beginning, as are the first intimations of civil society. This is no
sentimental issue of royal panoplies, as we see from the consequences in the
degenerations of states into empires and the dominations of elites. The moment
the state comes into existence, a problem arises, a permanent crisis of the
individual. Existence in a State is the first prerequisite to advance, but its
effects prove also counterproductive, and its effects on the individual will
generate the great dialectic of freedom in the state and freedom from the state
that will surge forward in the next Axial interval. Israel, let us note, is, not a
religion factory, but a response, as a state, at first, in the next step of the
eonic sequence, to the perceived histories of states and empires. Challenges to
the State arise in the next Axial phase of our eonic sequence. The
‘revolutionary idea’ is born in the Axial interval.
The rise of the Dynastic Pharaohs is spectacular, and a new
form is set for millennia. The lopsided history of the Pyramid Age in the early
third, followed by discontinuation, is an obvious clue. Many archaeologists have
remarked on the speed of emergence of higher civilization
, i.e. our transition, and in fact the phenomenon of thresholding is obvious
from the contrast of scales, before and after, especially in the case of Egypt.
From its modest Predynastic period, the phenomenon of the Egyptian civilization
that we know rises from the desert into its monumental grandeur. And then stops.
In the case of Sumer, we see a nexus of
city-states. The key technology is the invention of writing, and
the beginning, in the sense of many historians, of ‘history’. We are at the
threshold of the Urban Revolution
, so-called. We can cite Gordon Childe who
notes, in Man Makes Himself:
And so by 3000 B.C. the archaeologist’s picture of
Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Indus
valley no longer focuses attention on communities of simple farmers, but on
States embracing various professions and classes. The foreground is occupied by
priests, princes, scribes, and officials, and an army of specialized craftsmen,
professional soldiers, and miscellaneous laborers, all withdrawn from the
primary task of food-production. The most striking objects now unearthed are no
longer the tools of agriculture and the chase and other products of domestic
industry, but temple furniture, weapons, wheel-made pots, jewelry, and other
manufactures turned out on a large scale by skilled artisans. As monuments we
have instead of huts and farmhouses, monumental tombs, temples, palaces, and
workshops. And in them we find all manner of exotic substances, not as rarities,
but regularly imported and used in everyday life.
[i]
Childe’s delineation of the Neolithic or Agricultural and
the Urban Revolutions has drawn a number of criticisms, but it is useful enough.
These can be matched to our eonic sequence. The possible independent emergence
of agriculture is entirely possible. But the instance in the mainline takes off.
There is a suspicious resemblance between the two, for the Urban Revolution is
in reality also another agricultural revolution
whereby the birth of the structures of
the state, and higher civil society, emerge in relation to the regulation and
control of the productive surplus in forms of society labeled ‘hydraulic’ in the
world of the irrigated civilization we see in Egypt, and Sumer. Look at the rise
of the modern, it is an Industrial Revolution, but also still another
agricultural revolution.
We should emphasize the relative transform effect here.
Looking at overall world history we suspected that our eonic sequence begins
with the Neolithic. Our frontier effect suggests that some region round about
the first visible transition zone, most probably
Sumer
rather than Egypt,
will show an earlier transition. Not hard to find. Jump back 2400 years in a
possible source area nearby. In fact we can almost see one further north from
the Mesopotamian area, with clear indications of connections to the general
Neolithic in the Fertile Crescent. Thus our
account really begins in the prior era as this leads to the rise of Sumer, and its sidewinder, Egypt.
In Ancient Iraq,
George Roux unwittingly gives us the right chronology behind this, starting in Northern Mesopotamia in the wake of the first Neolithic
period, and ending in its Sumerian frontier adjacency zone.[ii]
The Hassuna period
ca. 5800-5500 BC
The Samarra period
ca. 5600-5000 BC
The Halaf period
ca. 5500-4500 BC
The Ubaid period
ca. 5000-3750 BC
The Uruk period
ca. 3750-3150 BC
The Jemdet Nasr period
ca. 3150-2900 BC
We can see the dates fit so well we can hazard a guess.
Clearly we are seeing two transitions separated by a mideonic interval. But what
of Egypt?
The rules of our eonic model allow us to consider sudden synchronous effects
inside the eonic sequence, during the transitions. Presto, Dynastic Egypt.
The Egyptian
sidewinder The case of the sidewinder Egypt can be understood by analogy
with the Axial Age, and remembering that the eonic effect shows intermittent
sequence, and (often)
synchronous emergence in the phase of transition. Consider China or India in the Axial Age. Isolated,
they suddenly ping in echo to the Axial concert. All other interactions are by
diffusion, before and after the Axial global convulsion. The eonic sequence
finds a mainline in the Greek/Israelite frontier transitions, but India and China suddenly show relative
emergence in an Axial echo as sidewinders to the mainline. China, far away and isolated, is
still in the diffusion field of the earlier era and is ready for the relative
beginning overlaid on its stream evolution. Something similar is obviously
evident in Egypt, which has a
parallel gestation in the diffusion field of the Neolithic, then suddenly shows
synchronous take-off in concert with Sumer.
Roman/American
sidewinders Two other later notable sidewinders, that might show the effect
are the Roman republic’s emergentism, that arises in tandem with the farflung
field of Greek city states stretching even into Italy and with their many
republican experiments, and the American which becomes an instant adjunct to the
English transition, then near its divide suddenly becomes a full-blown core
transition area at the end of the eighteenth century. The North American field
is really a flow zone for the English transition, and the relationship of small
to large region is no accident.
Despite the
confusing appearance, this tandem effect in Sumer/Egypt is thus suddenly
recognizable, and completely isomorphic to the case of the Axial Age. There is
also every possibility of direct diffusion of many Egyptian elements, e.g.
hieroglyphic writing. But these technological loans, if any, can’t explain the
autonomous integrated cultural advance perfectly correlated with high-level
eonic periodization, the ‘ET4’ interval. Such complex integrations don’t
diffuse. Note that in this kind of mechanism, sidewinders can seem to skip a
stage. There is nothing exact prior to ‘ET4’ in the Egyptian stream leading up
to civilization. It is not needed. This splitting of streams shows us there is
no unique mainline, and also shows a more efficient way to accelerate
development toward globalization
as the eonic sequence splits and
jumpstarts sidewinders that have had good prior diffusion.
A relative beginning To summarize, the ‘rise of
civilization’ becomes a relative beginning in a larger sequence, and this shows
the parallel interactive emergence of two
sources, an, at first, confusing situation. But we have the key. Study the Axial
Age examples and note the way the cultural stream crosses the eonic sequence, as
in Greece, or
Israel, to understand the lead ups to these
remarkable take-offs in tandem here.
Please note that our thesis is not about ‘quite a lot of
innovations somewhere within a millennium about here’ but about highly
compressed relative transformations in
a frequency sequence, something we see with stunning impact in the later cases,
but with just barely enough data here. Thus the data resembles the contrast of
medieval and modern times. The Middle Ages were quite sophisticated. But the
relative transformation of the rise of the modern is so massive as to be
unmistakable. Same here.
Once we grasp the factors of synchronous emergence and
relative transforms the emergence of Egypt/Sumer falls into place with an
abstract structure exactly like the later Axial Age.
This relative effect can also be seen
by zooming out and looking at the long periods
after the transitions: The fall-off is
suddenly obvious, especially in Egypt,
where the lack of cultural innovation after ca. –2000 haunts its history to the
end. Even if we can’t close on rich data at the level of decades to find a
divide, we can see the obvious high level fact that the whole system descends a
step and never recovers, whether we call that medievalism or not. Thus,
Mideonic slowdown
As Cyril Aldred notes of Egypt, the institutions of kingship
remained ‘frozen at the moment’ of their creation, while the first four
dynasties essentially created the forms of the entire Egyptian civilization, “as
soon as a solution had been sanctioned…there was no further development.” Much
of the Egypt
with which we are familiar is from a much later stage. It is thus easy to spot
in broad outline the basic factor of relative transformation.[iii]
The period of Egypt and Sumer, at their ‘beginnings’ near
–3000, constitutes the point at which the most basic fundamentals of man’s
‘civil condition’ came into existence over a substrate of previously achieved
agricultural life. And it did so very quickly. There is more than a family
resemblance to the phase of ‘modernism’ we claim
exclusively for the achievements of our own time, if we look at the same five
hundred years of the Sumerian emergence, three hundred of rapid advance, and two
of stabilizing crystallization after –3000, from its ‘medieval’ sources in the
religiously preoccupied world that came before of the Ubaid, and the Uruk.
Mideonic trend toward empire Another clue to our eonic
structure is the drift into mideonic dramas of empire, the curse of
civilization. The initial Sumerian innovative network of city-states so
reminiscent of later Greece
breaks down as the inexorable forces of integration precipitate the drift of the
system into imperial histories. Our model highlights at once the gross trend,
the curse of civilization, the mideonic drift into empire. The whole period
resembles the next, a century of democracy, then nothing. And yet our system is
unstable as the empire phases moves rapidly to generate greater integration in a
globalizing system.
The great Sumerian
tradition is born, and the forgotten Sumerian buried in Akkadian is
directly analogous to Latin buried in later languages in the next cycle. The
Cuneiform tradition dominates throughout, with the same effect in the case of Egypt
and its hieroglyphic literature.
In Mesopotamia, we see a
more characteristic reflection of our unit of analysis concept in the way the
‘civilization’ arising from the transition very soon changes its center of
gravity, as the Sumerians bestow ‘cuneiform’ culture on a long series of
expanding empires, beginning with the Akkadians. The center of gravity begins to
shift, but that is grist for the mill in the eonic model. A common tradition is
shared by all the descendants of the first phase, from the Akkadians to the
Hittites to the Assyrians. Only with Greece
and ‘Israel’
do we see the true eonic transform in action and this simply lifts the next
phase out of its sluggish Mesopotamian-Egyptian deep freeze. This culture
diffuses widely and, of course, the early world of Canaan, which will spawn the
‘Israel effect’
(Israel/Judah) of the next phase is inside this field of diffusion, a point
accurately reflected in the myths of an ‘Abraham’ from Ur.
Note: Gilgamesh and
writing The first great written literature emerges from the cuneiform
tradition, and the epic of Gilgamesh
is the first masterpiece in this great
stream. Although appearing relatively late in the mideonic period, we can follow
its earlier traces to the ‘revolution in writing’ sourcing in the Uruk world of
the transition, the ‘first city in human history’. All of the classic signs of a
relative transform are visible in the typical ‘continuity’ debate over its
origins.
Writing developed through a long process, beginning with
simple notations of images and numbers, needed by traders to account for goods
exchanged and received. According to one theory, full-scale writing gradually
emerged over the course of several centuries, as symbols accumulated and people
began to use them for their phonetic value. Yet widely scattered experimentation
would have produced a proliferation of mutually incomprehensible systems, each
useless to anyone beyond a given scribe and his circle. An increasing number of
historians of writing have come to regard this process as marked by punctuated
equilibrium, to use a term from evolutionary biology. In this theory, the
transition from established methods of accounting via symbols to true writing
entailed an intellectual revolution, carried out by a group of scribes working
together between 3300 and 3200 BCE to formulate the basic norms of a workable
system.[iv]
This passage speaks for itself in terms of our eonic
analysis. The influence of this and other works on the later Old Testament is
both a striking case of diffusion and an indication of the way our eonic system
acts recursively as it selects strains from its previous steps and remorphs them
again in its next transition, albeit cast in the new mode of monotheism.
[i]
Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself
(New York: New American Library, 1983):, p. 107. Bernard Knapp,
The History and Culture of Ancient Western Asia (Chicago: Dorsey,
1988), Marc Van De Mieroop, A
History of The Ancient Near East (Malden,
MA: Blackwell, 2004).
[ii]
George Roux, Ancient Iraq (New York: Penguin, 1992),
p. 48.
[iii] Cyril Aldred,
Egypt
to the End of the Old Kingdom (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 52.
[iv]
David Damrosch, The Buried Book
(New York: Henry Holt,
2006), p. 241.
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