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The companion to
flat history is a conflict theory claiming to explain it. A little thought might
suggest why: if all you see is a flat history of conflict then it seems logical
to deduce that it is conflict that carries the day, and hence the future. But,
actually, a closer looks shows that this thinking is false.
In any case, once
we deconstruct flat history, a strange new situation arises: the standard type
of historical explanation, often a conflict theory, goes bankrupt, and a sense
of the meaning of history takes form. It is obvious from the eonic effect,
despite its enigma, that innovations spring from something else than conflict! A
good example of a conflict theory is Darwinian evolution. Most of all the
competition for the local future via conflict ceases to hold sway. Our eonic
system shows something unexpected: it seems to leapfrog g into a future course
correction. Modern social thought, in the dread legacy of reductionism, is
littered with conflict theories,
Darwin
’s the most obvious, the results of staring at ‘flat history’ and asking
how the big changes could ever occur. Somehow randomness has to hire
‘conflict’ as the generative scheme. Then a wistful glance at Adam Smith
occurs, and ‘hard-headed realists’ are finished with ‘ethical nonsense’
as pseudo-theory gets down to the serious business of Progress through Selfish
Mayhem.
Incredulity
Toward ‘Infranarratives’ Despite
the cogency of postmodern critiques, incredulity toward metanarraatives, it is
the ‘infranarrative
’ that is really at fault in the legitimation ideologies under
examination. The ‘flat history’ desert drives the agent in his thirst for
conflict, and some theory to justify that. Economic competition, natural
selection, Hegelian dialectic and ‘negation’, class struggle, even Kant’s
‘asocial sociability’ emerge as the leading contenders.
The place of
conflict in history is historically given. Its generalization to a ‘conflict
theory’ is something else. Until you can deconstruct flat history, conflict
tends to haunt you in your search for a mechanism of history, the key to your
Big Theory. All you see is conflict, therefore conflict must, somehow, be the
key. It doesn’t follow. Marx almost escaped from the trap, was just at the
point of exposing the whole game, but we should note that Hegel, a student of
Smith, mixed ‘cunning of reason’ with ‘dialectic’, a conflict theory
(!), and Marx, although rightly suspicious of the Adam Smith effect taken as
ideology, drifted into the Hegelian trap (negation of the negation as grounds
for revolutionary conflict, hence class struggle), and was followed by Engels
who bit on the Darwin hook, despite Marx’s sniffing suspicions. Marx saw at
once the connection to economic ideology, but somehow the later Marxism became
more Darwinian than the Darwinists, with violent conflict and even class
struggle mixed up with evolutionary innuendoes. It’s a sorry history, and even
the great Kant nearly falls into the trap. But he was just on the verge and
suspected rightly something different. We will take up his suggestion in the
next section, and try to rescue his viewpoint from this trap.
This is not some
idealistic rejection of the place of conflict in history. A good case can be
made that martial conflict becomes so vexatious for rival parties that the very
process of conflict leads to initiatives of peace. The place of conflict in
history requires its own analysis, as does the history of warfare. Our objection
is the generalization of this as a principle to explain everything else, as a
theory of evolution.
Conflict theory,
then, with a dash of Malthus, is suddenly hallucinated as the only candidate
relevant to real science. The reason is that it is close at hand, like the
teeming fields of competing life visible to the biologist, who cannot reckon the
‘hurricane argument’ over long time periods, for the elusive signs of
directional evolution. Thus the conflict visible in the small rises to flush out
motives of all other sorts. One would have thought someone would consider that a
selfish motive is as (philosophically) ‘idealist’ as an altruistic one. Adam
Smith seems to stand alone, however, as an honest commentator about economies,
where competition is indeed a clear factor that requires careful treatment. But
economic competition is not the driver of cultural advance, and Smith never said
it was. Will the real Adam Smith stand up? The source of all these
conflict theories was talking about something else. Note, in any case, that
economic competition is conducted under a system of laws, supposedly, and
immediately gets into trouble in a global field where those laws are not always
specified, the beginning and end of the woes of ‘imperialism’, as global
competition. So the evolution of laws can never be omitted from considerations
of evolutionary economy.
Armed with a snapshot
of the eonic effect
, we can see at a glance that there is
something completely wrong with selectionist theories, these being a special
case of conflict theories. It is suddenly easy to see the problem: the Assyrians
are a good case of the fittest. After two millennia of competition, these were
the top dogs, so to speak. Then in the Axial interval new bypass sequences
appear from nowhere and outstrip this deadlock. In general, the biggest empire
is the fittest survivor. Now look at the eonic sequence that we have already
outlined in our short history of the world, starting with the early Sumerians,
who resemble the Greeks with their thriving small-scale city-states. Note what
it shows: three turning points, and two mideonic eras in between them. Note
closely, zooming in, that the mideonic periods show the fate of competitive
‘free action’, and the way this induces decline, with a strong trend toward
empire consolidation. Even religion falls into the trend.
Note then how the system is dependent on its transitions to
upgrade its act, ‘evolve’, often in a safe frontier area, and that this
generates the pattern of non-random evolution. Thus it is important to challenge
the dominant view here for we can see that it will slowly but surely degrade the
tone of modernism and provoke the dilemma of mideonic drift.
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